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Corporate Governance and the diversification discount: 
The implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We examine whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a major role in reducing the diversification 
discount and enhancing internal capital markets efficiency. The act proposes new rules and 
regulations on financial practice and reshapes corporate governance to insure alignment of 
incentives between corporate insiders and investors. We check the relationship between 
corporate governance variables and the diversification discount. Finally, we conclude the 
indirect effects of the act in enhancing efficiency and reducing the diversification discount. We 
find that the level of corporate governance, especially CEO power, affects the efficient 
allocation of resources and the diversification discount correspondingly. However, we find that 
the sensitivity of the diversification discount to CEO power decreases significantly after the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which implies that the restrictions and regulations 
passed by the act enhance corporate governance and limit the misallocation of resources and 
the diversification discount respectively.  
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Introduction
The issue of corporate diversification attracts a lot of attention among academic researchers; 
many tackle the benefits, costs, and market reactions to corporate diversification as well as the 
reasons behind it. Martin and Sayrak (2001) document several rounds in the debate concerning 
the added value of corporate diversification; diversification discount seems to appear, 
disappear, and even transform to a premium creating a cyclical trend favoring or disfavoring 
corporate diversification. Although Servaes (1996) admits that the reason behind changes in the 
diversification discount is still a puzzle, many studies link it to various variables with the most 
recent pointing to corporate governance variables. In our paper, we check whether or not the 
trend was in favor of corporate diversification over the period 1996 – 2005. We also investigate 
the effect of corporate governance variables, especially CEO power, on the diversification 
discount (premium) and their relative sensitivity and variation over that period with 
considerable attention to the changes in sensitivity pre- and post-SOX.  
: 
Corporate Governance has a great impact on firms’ performance; better governed firms 
outperform their rivals due to the efficiency of their governance structure. One of the most 
influencing factors in firms’ corporate governance is their CEO power. CEO power is a measure 
of CEO independence in taking investment decisions, where less CEO power suggest that 
decisions are taken by a coalition of directors rather than solely by the CEO. The presence of a 
powerful CEO is in some aspects beneficial to the firm. The powerful CEO has the ability to be 
more flexible and to act quickly to benefit from promising opportunities. He can also be more 
creative in developing ideas and finding solutions to emerging problems. However, as the firm 
size increases and the firm becomes more diversified the effect of CEO power turns to be 
negative.  
CEO in a large diversified firm has to take critical decisions involving different and 
unrelated industries, and more importantly manage efficiently the firm internal capital market 
through allocating internally generated funds to the most profitable sectors. These allocation 
decisions are very critical to firm performance as investing in lower tobin’s Q projects will lead 
to value destruction. Initially, the CEO has the incentive to invest in high tobin’s Q projects as a 
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large part of his compensation is directly related to firm’ performance. However, powerful CEOs 
in firms with poor corporate governance are driven to take wrong investment decisions either 
to extract some unlawful benefits or as a result of rent-seeking behavior of divisional managers. 
As the level of diversification increases in large firms, CEOs ability to follow up with the 
increasing number of different divisions will decrease. In this way, CEOs will rely more on 
divisional managers to get the insights of their divisions. Accordingly, rent-seeking behavior will 
emerge in these diversified firms as some divisional managers will spend more time lobbying in 
order to convince the CEO to direct additional funds towards their poorly performing divisions. 
These acts will result in an inefficient allocation of resources as the firm will invest funds in less 
promising projects and consequently the firm will lose value. 
In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley act was passed as a response to major corporate scandals. 
The provisions of the act attempt to enhance corporate governance and to put some binding 
restrictions on CEOs actions in publicly traded firms. CEOs involved in misconduct are more 
likely to be involved in other forms of destructive behavior. Such behavior involves the 
misallocation of internally generated funds. Through empowering corporate governance and 
making the CEO more vulnerable to stricter penalties in case of misconduct, SOX indirectly 
encourages the CEO to take decisions in the best interest for investors. Such decisions involve a 
better management of firms’ internal capital market. Therefore, we can conclude that the act 
will indirectly enhance diversified firms’ internal capital market and limits value loss in these 
firms. 
Using a sample of 849 diversified firms over the period 1996-2005 we test the sensitivity 
of the internal capital markets efficiency and the diversification discount to corporate 
governance variables. We also check the change in sensitivity caused by the implementation of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley act. We find a positive relationship between poor corporate governance 
and the diversification discount. We also find that CEO power is the most influencing 
governance variable on the inefficient allocation of resources and on the diversification 
discount respectively. Most importantly, we find that the negative effect of CEO power 
5 
 
decreases significantly after the implementation of the act. These findings suggest a major role 
of the act in limiting the diversification discount. 
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First of all, our results support 
previous findings of the relationship between the inefficient internal capital market and the 
diversification discount. Moreover, our findings stress on the relevance of corporate 
governance, especially CEO power, in affecting the efficient allocation of resources and 
therefore in determining the diversification discount. Finally, our study highlights on some 
hidden benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in reducing the value loss resulted from corporate 
diversification. By empowering corporate governance and binding CEOs actions, the act directs 
CEOs into investment decisions creating more firm value.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 contains related literature. 
Section 2 includes the hypothesis development and the tested hypotheses. Section 3 contains 
our sample and measures. In Sections 4 we present the results of our empirical analysis. Finally, 
we conclude in Section 5. 
 
1. Literature Review: 
1.1. Conglomerate and Corporate Diversification: 
Numerous studies in the finance literature tackle the topic of corporate diversification, and the 
debate continues on whether diversification creates or destroys value. Corporate diversification 
gained momentum in late 1960s with the first conglomerate merger wave. At that time, several 
potential diversification benefits were documented; Lewellen (1971) shows how the 
coinsurance effect - a result of imperfect correlation between cash flows generated by different 
divisions - lead to a better debt capacity for diversified firms. This higher debt ability allows 
diversified firms to benefit from higher leverage levels and better interest tax shields. Another 
tax advantage was later revealed by Majd and Myers (1987); Majd and Myers state that as long 
as one or more segments of a conglomerate firm suffer losses in some periods, this 
conglomerate will pay less tax than its segments would pay separately due to the tax code’s 
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asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. Other benefits include synergy and economies of 
scale through reducing the fixed cost of production, greater operating efficiency, and more 
market power. However, the most prominent advantage of conglomerates was revealed to be 
their “efficient” internal capital markets. 
 
1.2 Internal Capital Markets: 
Corporate diversification is considered to be a normal result of a firm growth, allowing the firm 
to benefit from alternative growth opportunities (Gomes and Livdan 2002) and to efficiently 
allocate funds generated internally through directing these funds from the least to the most 
profitable projects. Stein (1997) explains how this efficient allocation of internal resources, also 
known as internal capital market, can lead to value creation for diversified firms. The 
importance of these internal capital markets is even more illustrated when external capital 
markets are costly or less developed (Williamson 1975; Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo 1998). 
Moreover, due to the conglomerates’ ability to create a larger and more efficient internal 
capital market (Weston 1970) these firms can limit the underinvestment problem (Stulz 1990). 
However, and despite the potential benefits of internal capital markets, it was later discovered 
that diversified firms failed most of the time to direct resources to their highest valued projects, 
creating therefore an inefficient internal capital market. Consequently, this inefficient allocation 
causes these firms to lose value. 
 
1.3 The Diversification Discount: 
In 1980s the diversification trend was reversed as firms entered an era of refocusing as 
documented by Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and Comment and Jarrell (1995)1; this 
reversal was mainly due to a belief that corporate diversification destroys value2
                                                          
1 Comment and Jarrell reveal that single business firms increased from 38.1% of exchange-listed firms in 1979 to 
55.7% in 1988, and conclude that reduction in corporate diversification results in an increase in firm value. 
. The notion 
diversification discount was soon introduced by Lang and Stulz (1994) and many later studies 
have identified that diversified firms sell at a market discount when compared to specialized 
2 Other possible reasons for this reversal were discussed; Shliefer and Vishny (1991) conclude that the looser 
antitrust policy in 1980s has allowed firms to refocus on their core line of business through horizontal mergers and 
acquisitions. Liebeskind and Opler (1994) argue that this fact was driven by the intensifying global competition. 
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stand-alone firms (Servaes 1996, Lins and Servaes 1999, Denis, Denis and Yost 2002). Berger 
and Ofek (1995) reveal that the discount reached an average of 13% to 15% over the period 
1986-1991, and that this discount is correlated with the inefficient allocation of resources – 
investments in low Q segments. Diversified firms were over investing in projects with lower 
tobin’s Q; this inefficiency was mainly due to the agency problem (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 
2000) and to the rent-seeking behavior of divisional managers (Scharfstein and Stein 2000).  
Further studies show that selections bias, endogeneity problems, and measurement 
errors may be the reasons behind the diversification discount. Whited (2001) explains how the 
inaccurate measurement of Tobin’s Q may give misleading results and concludes that inefficient 
investment does not cause the diversification discount. Campa and Kedia (2002) show that 
selection bias and endogeneity problems explain to a large extent the diversification discount. 
They also state that conglomerate firms sell at a discount prior to the diversification decision. 
Similar results were also found by Villalonga (2004), where she finds that the diversification 
discount disappears after using three different treatment effects estimators to control for 
endogeneity, and selection bias. Mansi and Reeb (2002), conclude that using book values of 
debt in computing excess value creates a downward bias for diversified firms. Furthermore, 
Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) show that much of the excess value reduction occurs 
because diversified firms acquire already discounted business units, and not because 
diversification destroys value. 
  
1.4 Recent Studies: 
Many recent studies note that corporate diversification creates value, and that diversified firms 
sell at a market premium rather than a market discount. However, some of these studies link 
the diversification discount to changes in economic conditions supporting the idea of a cyclical 
trend favoring or disfavoring corporate diversification strategy. In a study on the plant level, 
Maskimovic and Philips (2002) find that conglomerates are no less or even more productive 
than focused firms. Akbulut and Matsusaka (2008), after analyzing the effects of 4,764 mergers 
over the period 1950 – 2006, conclude that corporate diversification improves corporate 
performance and leads most of the time to value creation. Hovakimian (2009) find that the 
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internal capital market efficiency in diversified firms is related to the business cycle and state 
that internal capital markets efficiency increases during recessions, when external capital 
market are more restrictive. These results were supported by new findings by Kuppuswamy and 
Villalonga (2010), where they reveal that diversified firms increased in value relative to stand 
alone firms during the financial crisis due to the debt coinsurance and to a more efficient 
internal capital market.  
Meanwhile a large number of academic literature on corporate diversification have 
stressed the relevance of corporate governance in determining the diversification discount. 
Jiraporn, Kim, Davidson, and Singh (2005) conclude that when shareholders rights are more 
restricted (weaker corporate governance), the management tend to diversify the firm unwisely 
resulting in value destruction. Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack (2011) find that the 
diversification discount is affected to a large extent by corporate governance variables. These 
findings were also consistent with results of similar studies (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; 
Sautner, and Villalonga, 2010).  Finally, Ammann, Hoechle, and Schmid (2011), stress out on the 
importance of corporate governance in determining the diversification discount and state that 
the diversification discount may be due to agency problems rather than to cross-subsidization 
of divisions.   
In this paper, we use a set of variables (focusing on corporate governance variables) to 
identify the main variables affecting the inefficient allocation of resources and the 
diversification discount (premium). Consequently, by testing market reactions to corporate 
inefficiency, we conclude to which extent the diversification discount is explained by the 
inefficient internal capital markets. And finally, we check whether recent corporate legislation 
has a great impact on corporate diversification through imposing restrictions and limitations on 
directors’ misconduct. In order to accomplish our task, we use an exogenous event 3
                                                          
3 Many studies have used changes in law as exogenous shocks in order to overcome the endogeneity problem.  
Giannetti and Laeven (2009), employ a pension reform in Sweden to explore the effects of institutional ownership 
on performance. While Sautner and Villalonga (2010), use a tax reform in Germany as an exogenous event to 
discover the link between corporate governance and internal capital markets. 
 that have a 
direct effect on firms’ corporate governance; The Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
9 
 
1.5 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (also known as SOX) is considered one of the most important securities 
legislation since 1930s4
Since its introduction, the act created a large debate among researchers on its 
consequences and economic implications (Romano 2005, 2009; Zhang 2007; Li, Pincus and Rego 
2007; Leuz 2007; Cohen, Dey and Lys 2008). Most of the researchers stress the negative effects 
of the act: the high implementation costs (Solomon and Bryan-Low, 2004), and the fact that 
some small firms are going private to avoid compliance costs associated with SOX (Engel, Hayes 
and Wang 2007).   
. SOX was passed by the congress on July 25, 2002 as a quick response to 
major corporate scandals at that time (Enron, Tyco International, WorldCom, and other firms 
involved in fraudulent acts). The act, that also followed the 2000 dot-com bubble, intended to 
regain investors’ confidence in American Capital Markets through setting new rules and 
regulations on corporations, corporate directors and auditors.  
In this paper, we do not address further economic benefits or costs of the act. Instead, 
we test the indirect effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on diversified firms, the internal capital 
markets, and the diversification discount (premium). The Act proposed new rules and 
regulations on financial practice and reshaped corporate governance to insure alignment of 
incentives between corporate insiders and investors. The Act requires more timely disclosure 
on insider transactions, independence of the audit committee, a majority of independent 
directors on corporate boards, and certification of the financial statements by both the CEO and 
the CFO. In addition, the act imposes higher penalty on any officer responsible of manipulating 
or forging documents. We will check whether such changes affecting firms’ corporate 
governance represent a shifting point in the elimination of the diversification discount, or were 
just a continuation of a previous trend. 
 
 
                                                          
4 President G.W. Bush at the signing ceremony of SOX: “the most far-reaching reforms of American business 
practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt” 
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2. Hypotheses: 
In our paper, we develop two main hypotheses. In the first hypothesis we link the inefficiency in 
internal capital market to poor corporate governance and especially to misuse of CEO power. 
As this inefficient allocation of resources lead to value loss (diversification discount); we link the 
diversification discount directly to poor corporate governance. Our second hypothesis states 
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a major role in reducing the diversification discount. This 
reduction is mainly due to the role of the act in enhancing firms’ corporate governance and in 
limiting the destructive behavior of powerful CEOs represented by the misallocation of firms’ 
resources. 
2.1 Governance Structure and Internal Capital Market Efficiency 
One of the most important business decisions in diversified firms is the allocation of internally 
generated funds across different segments. Shin and Stulz (1998) argue that internal capital 
markets are efficient if resources are directed to the most profitable projects in a way that 
maximize shareholder wealth. However, internal capital markets inefficiency has arisen due to 
agency problem and rent seeking behavior in diversified firms (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 
2000; Scharfstein and Stein 2000); Such inefficiency occurs when poor corporate governance 
structure allows the CEO to intentionally misallocate resources in order to grab some private 
benefits. Therefore, in firms with better corporate governance the CEO will be less likely to 
follow such destructive behavior. As a result, diversified firms with better corporate governance 
allocate their resources more efficiently and make better investment decision. 
Berger and Ofek (1995) find a positive correlation between the diversification discount 
and the inefficient allocation of resources (investment in low Tobin’s Q). It seems like the 
diversification discount represent the market reaction to such inefficiency. Stock performance 
reflects investors’ perception of current firm performance and their expectations about its 
future variation. As a result, investors punish firms with bad performance by dropping the 
stocks of these firms from their portfolios. This act will lead to a decrease in the price of these 
stocks, which will start selling at a discount compared to other firms with better performance. 
11 
 
Therefore, diversified firms suffering from inefficient allocation of resources will drag a negative 
market reaction and the stocks of such firms will sell at a discount dragging the market value of 
the firm below its optimal level. 
Moreover, many studies link firms’ performance to corporate governance; Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2004) show that firms with better 
corporate governance and stronger stockholder rights have higher firm value. These findings 
imply that diversified firms’ performance will also be affected by corporate governance 
structure. Such conclusions were also reached by Masulis, Wang, and Xie, (2007), and Sautner, 
and Villalonga (2010), and Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack (2011). As corporate 
governance is increasing as a result of corporate legislation and recent trend in ownership 
structure, all firms including diversified firms will increase in value. At the same time, as 
diversified firms suffer more from poor corporate governance, the improvement in corporate 
governance should affect diversified firms’ value more than that of focused firms. Therefore, 
the diversification discount should drop as a result of the change in corporate governance.   
Hypothesis 1
 
: Poor Corporate Governance and high CEO Power lead the way to the inefficient 
allocation of resources causing therefore the diversification discount. 
2.2 The Role of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: 
Although of the intended benefits of corporate legislation, it is still considered to be a double 
edge sword as time reveals indirect benefits and costs for such legislation.  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act came as a consequence to major corporate scandals and intended to rebuild investors’ 
confidence and to limit the likelihood of corporate misconduct. SOX, quickly received negative 
feedback with most of economists pointing to its indirect disadvantages including the high 
implementation costs. Another indirect cost revealed to be management’s time consumption, 
as officers will have to spend more time monitoring to check whether they are complying with 
the provisions of the act instead of focusing on their own duties; such time consumption will 
certainly result in a lower performance for the firm. As indirect costs have emerged, indirect 
benefits have also emerged. Through imposing several provisions on corporate governance, the 
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Sarbanes-Oxley enhances the firms’ corporate governance leading therefore to better 
investment decisions and to more efficient allocation of firms’ resources. As a result, the Act 
plays an important role in increasing the excess value of the firm and therefore in the reduction 
of the diversification discount. 
Hypothesis 2
 
: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act enhances corporate governance and reduces the 
negative effects of CEO Power on firm value. 
3. Data and Variables  
3.1 Data and Methodology 
In this section we describe the sample used in our paper and the methodology applied to 
compute the inefficient allocation of resources, and the diversification discount. 
The primary sample used in our analysis is for all the firms over the period 1996-2005 on 
the active and research files of the COMPUSTAT segment database. COMPUSTAT segment files 
contain data on separate segments whose sales, assets, or profits exceed 10% of consolidated 
totals5
                                                          
5 Until 1997, U.S. publically traded firms were required by the FASB (SFAS 14) to report such information for both 
business and geographical segments meeting the 10% criteria. Since 1998, the new regulation (SFAS 131) requires 
firms to use their own segment breakdown in reporting to reflect the way they organize business activities 
internally for purposes of allocating resources and evaluating performance. 
. Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we exclude financial firms and all firms which had at 
least one segment in the financial services industry (SIC 6000-6999).  We also exclude firms 
having at least one segment in utilities (SIC 4900-4999), as well as American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs). We limit our sample to firms whose total assets are above $20 million to 
prevent distortions caused by small firms. Finally, firms reporting multiple segments within the 
same 3-digit code are excluded from the diversified firms sample and added to stand alone 
firms. These procedures limit our sample to 19,428 observations of multi-segment firms. Then, 
we match this sample of diversified firms with Compustat industrial files. Firms that do not have 
complete data on the Compustat industrial files are excluded from the sample. The Compustat 
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industrial files are also used to get the industry data, which we will use to compute the 
diversification discount. Finally, we use Execucomp files in order to get the governance 
variables used in our analysis. Thus, to be included in our sample, firms must have complete 
data in all three files, Compustat industrial, segment and Execucomp6. After merging data from 
the three data files, our final sample drops to 849 multi-segment firms with 5,385 
observations 7
Table 2 represents summary statistics of the diversified firms’ sample. The average firm 
has $6 billion of assets, $7 billion of annual sales, and a total capital of $13 billion. Furthermore, 
the average number of segments that a firm operates is about 3 at the 3-digit code. The 
average level of diversification in our sample is relatively low (1.9), with the 95
. Table 1 represents the distribution of multi-segment firms in our sample by the 
number of 3-digit code segments. 43.47% of the firm-years observations are for two-segment 
firms, 34.61% for 3-segment firms, 12.59% for 4-segment firms and 7.41% are for 5-segment 
firms. Only 1.91% of the observations are for 6 or more segment firms. 
th
3.2 Variables Description 
 percentile 
corresponding to 3.49. 
3.2.1. Measuring firm diversification:  
We use 2 variables to measure the level of diversification of multi-segment firms; the number 
of segments and the diversification level. The number of segments equals the number of 3-digit 
code segments operated by the multi-segment firm. While, the diversification level equals the 
inverse of Herfindahl index of segments’ asset-weights. This variable ranges from a minimum of 
one (the lowest level diversification, the case of a completely focused firm) to a maximum of 10 
(the maximum level of diversification, firm operating in 10 different segments with 10% asset 
weight for each). 
 
                                                          
6 We do not require complete data availability for all measures to maximize the sample size. 
7 When we merge Compustat data with Execucomp data, we lose a large number of observations. We also note 
that large firms are more represented in our final sample as these firms are more represented on the Execucomp 
data files. 
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3.2.2. Measuring Corporate Governance: 
We use 10 different variables to measure firms’ corporate governance. However, our greatest 
attention is to CEO power and attributes, as the CEO power determines the flexibility of the 
CEO in taking solely or jointly investment decisions. The effectiveness of these decisions will be 
later reflected in the stock price affecting therefore the firm value. The variables are divided 
into 3 subcategories: CEO Power, Board and Audit Characteristics, and Ownership Structure. 
A. CEO Power: 
Shliver and Vishney (1989) argue that CEOs’ incentive to reduce their personal risk motivates 
them to diversify the firm in multiple lines of business. Such diversification will allow them to 
have more market power and to take more critical decisions. One of the most important 
decisions is the allocation of internally generated resources; such decision has a great impact 
on the firm’s performance. Several studies reveal that the variability in firms’ performance is 
directly related to CEO power as the powerful CEO can make extreme decisions (Adams, 
Almeida and Ferreira (2005). Moreover, Boumosleh (2007) finds that powerful CEOs – those 
extracting above optimal pay – have greater impact in allocating financial resources of multi-
segment firms as they take solely such decisions. He also finds a negative relationship between 
CEO power and efficient allocation of resources in diversified firms. Consequently, we expect 
the CEO power variable to negatively affect corporate governance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
limits extreme behavior of CEOs through exposing them to greater litigation risks, and imposing 
more rigid penalties on any executive charged with fraudulent act. According to the act, CEOs 
and CFOs of all public firms are required to certify financial statements reported to the SEC 
(Section 302). They are also required to repay any incentive-based compensation or profits 
resulting from the sale of stock received within 12 months of any restatement due to 
misconduct (Section 304). 
For CEO power we use 3 different variables: CEO power, CEO chair, and CEO 
compensation. CEO power is a dummy variable that reflects the CEO ability to take 
independent decisions. The CEO is considered powerful if he is the only insider on the board of 
directors or if he is the president and the chairman of the board at the same time. The variable 
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is equal to 1 if the CEO is powerful, 0 otherwise. Total CEO Compensation is equal to: Salary + 
Bonus + Other Annual + Restricted Stock Grants + Long Term Plan Investment Payouts + Value 
of Option Grants. Finally, the CEO chair is also a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is at the 
same time the Chairman of the Board, 0 otherwise. 
B. Board and Audit Characteristics: 
Board of directors plays a vital role in minimizing agency costs arising from the separation of 
ownership and control (Fama and Jensen 1983). Board role in monitoring firm performance 
becomes more challenging when the firm grows and operates in multiple segments; members 
of the board should be familiar with different industries in which the firm operates in order to 
investigate investment decisions. So, in diversified firms a larger board of directors should 
monitor better the allocation of internal resources process, and enhance corporate governance. 
On the other hand, Fama (1980) identify the composition of the board as an important element 
in creating an effective board monitoring management actions. The presence of outside 
directors on the board increases the independence of the board, and improves corporate 
governance. Such independence is also supported by the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
where a majority of outside directors is required on corporate boards. Finally, the frequency of 
the board meetings is an indicator to the board commitments toward good monitoring of the 
firms’ management. Higher meetings frequency is correlated with better supervision and 
therefore with better governance. 
For board characteristics we use 3 different variables: board size, board independence, 
and board meeting. Board size is equal to the number of directors on the board. Board 
independence is equal to the proportion of outside directors on the board. Finally, board 
meeting is equal to the number of board meetings during the year.  
The Audit Committee plays an essential role in improving the credibility of firms’ 
disclosure and reducing the information asymmetry between management and stockholders 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes several restrictions on external and 
internal auditing as well.  Section 404 of the Act requires that management assess internal 
controls and that auditors’ report on the internal control of their clients. Furthermore, the Act 
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requires independence of the audit committee; the independence of the audit committee is 
measured by the proportion of outside directors in the committee. The presence of outside 
directors should improve auditing quality, and enhance corporate governance. 
We use a dummy variable to account for the independence of Audit Committee (dummy 
variable equals one if the Audit Committee is composed entirely of outside directors and zero 
otherwise) 
C. Ownership Structure: 
Ownership structure has had radical changes in the recent years with the emergence of 
institutional investors as the major player in the US stock market. In this study we are only 
interested in two main aspects of the ownership structure: Insider Ownership and Institutional 
Ownership. 
Fama and Jensen (1983), argue that higher insider ownership increases firm value, as 
insiders have an incentive to align their investment decisions with preferences of other 
stockholders. Furthermore, Megginson, Morgan, and Nail (2000), find that firms with lower 
level of managerial ownership are more likely to be involved in diversifying activities through 
stock financed mergers. So, greater insiders’ ownership will be beneficial for the firm and will 
enhance its corporate governance. However, as insiders possess access to private information 
unavailable to the public (allowing them to snatch above average returns on their stock 
transactions), legislators has imposed several restrictions on their stock transactions. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes further restrictions on such transactions; according to section 306 
insiders are required to report stock transactions involving the firm stock within two days of the 
transaction.  
As a proxy for managerial ownership, we use three variables: insider ownership, 
directors’ ownership, and CEO ownership. Insider ownership is equal to the proportion of 
common equity held by the firm’s directors and officers. Directors’ ownership is equal to the 
proportion of common equity held by directors. Finally, CEO ownership is equal to the 
proportion of common equity held by the CEO.  
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Table 3 presents summary statistics of corporate governance variables of the multi-
segment firms in our sample. The average diversified firm has 8 board members of whom 65% 
are outside directors, and who meets 7 times per year. Moreover, average director ownership 
is 7% of total shares outstanding, while the average ownership of CEO and insiders are 3% and 
4% respectively. 78% of the diversified firms have an independent audit committee, 62% are 
directed by a powerful CEO, and 67% have the CEO also chairing the board of directors. Finally, 
the average salary of the CEO is $5 million.  
3.2.3. Measuring the Diversification Discount: 
In order to measure the diversification discount or the loss in value due to diversification, we 
use a similar approach to that used by Berger and Ofek (1995). We use an excess value measure 
as we compare the diversified firm market value to the sum of imputed market values of its 
different segments. In order to do this, we calculate the ratio of market value to assets for each 
industry. Then, we multiply the multiple segments’ assets of a diversified firm by the ratio of 
their corresponding industries. After adding up these computed values we get the imputed 
market value of the firm. Finally, we subtract the imputed market value of the firm’ segments 
from the market value of the diversified firm and divide the residual over the market value of 
the diversified firm. Therefore, if the market value of the diversified firm is greater than the 
market value of its separate segments we will have a positive excess value or a diversification 
premium. The diversification discount will arise in the opposite case where the value of the 
diversified firm is less than the aggregate value of its separate segments treated as stand-alone 
firms. In this case the diversification will lead to value destruction and the excess value of 
diversification will be negative.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
First of all, we analyze the evolution in corporate governance variables after the 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley act. We divide our sample into two sub-categories: Pre-
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SOX (1996-2001) and Post-SOX (2003-2005)8
Although we can notice an increase in CEO power post-SOX, the provisions of the act 
impose tightening restrictions on the CEO actions preventing to a large extent destructive 
behavior and misconduct. Consequently, CEO increasing power does not prevent him from 
being more vulnerable to stiffer penalties and regulations. Therefore, the CEO has now more 
incentives to align his objectives with those of the firm’s stockholders, and most importantly to 
use his growing power in increasing firm value.  
. We can notice from table 5 significant changes as 
a result of the implementation of the act. The act requires independence of both the board of 
directors and the audit committee. Consequently, we find that the percentage of outside 
directors on the board of directors increases from 58% to approximately 70%, whereas the 
percentage of outside directors on the audit committee – already high prior to the act - 
increases by only 2%. The board size also increases from an average of 6 to 9 members. 
Moreover, CEOs power and compensation increase after 2002, and an additional 7% of CEOs 
become chair of the board. However, we find that insiders’ ownership as well as CEO and 
directors’ ownership decrease significantly post-SOX. Consequently, we find some preliminary 
support for Hypothesis 2 in that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enhances corporate governance. 
In the next step we use correlation matrix to study the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and the efficient allocation of resources measured by Tobin’s Q. As we 
have high correlation between some of the independent variables, we repeat the correlation 
test several times after eliminating one of the variables of the highly correlated pair. Table 6 
presents the correlation matrix between the efficient allocation of resources, 3 governance 
variables (directors ownership, CEO power and board independence), one measure of 
diversification (number of segments) and one firm characteristic variable (assets of the firm).  
We find support to our first hypothesis as we can notice a negative relationship between CEO 
power and the efficient allocation of resources. Moreover, we find a positive relationship 
between the other governance variables and the efficient allocation of internal resources. 
Finally, we note that CEO power is inversely related to firm size measured by its total assets.  
                                                          
8 We exclude year 2002 because the passage and implementation of the act took place in that same year.  
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Less CEO power in large firms leads us to conclude that decisions in large firms are mostly taken 
by a coalition of directors rather than solely by the CEO. 
We proceed to test our hypotheses using multivariate analysis, by regressing the 
efficient allocation of resources and the excess value in tables 7 and 8 respectively. In table 7, 
we run three different regressions; the first one covers the entire sample period, while the 
other ones cover Pre-SOX period (1996-2001) and Post-SOX period (2003-2005) respectively. 
The results in the three regressions show a negative sensitivity of the firm efficient allocation of 
resources towards CEO power. Therefore, we can conclude that the higher the CEO power, the 
lower the internal capital market efficiency. This negative relationship is consistent with our 
first hypothesis. On the other hand, we notice a significant decrease in the sensitivity of the 
efficient allocation of resources relative to the CEO power post-SOX. The sensitivity decreases 
from (-0.123) to (-0.068). This decrease supports our second hypothesis stating that the 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enhance corporate governance and limits the negative 
effect of CEO power.  
Table 8 presents evidence on the relation between corporate governance and the 
diversification discount. In this table we use regression to test the relationship between 
corporate governance and the excess value of the firm. We run three different regressions to 
the excess value of the diversified firms using the same methodology applied in table 7. This 
time we find a negative relationship between CEO power and the excess value. This indicates 
that, all else being equal, diversified firms run by a powerful CEO lose value and that the stocks 
of such firms are more likely to sell at a market discount. This result is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1 about the positive relationship between poor corporate governance and the 
diversification discount. Once again we notice a significant decrease in the sensitivity of the 
excess value of the firm relative to the CEO power post-SOX; the sensitivity decreases from (-
0.166) to (-0.014). Although of the increase in CEO power over the sample period, the negative 
effect of that power decreases significantly. These findings provide further support to our 
second hypothesis stating that the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reduce the 
diversification discount through limiting the negative effect of CEO power. We can also notice 
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the positive relationship between the efficient allocation of resources and the excess value of 
the firm all over the period 1996-2005. Finally, while repeating multiple regressions using 
different variables we extract positive relationship between most of corporate governance 
variables and the excess value of the firm.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Diversification benefits (costs) seem to change over time. Changes in corporate diversification 
variables will also mean that new benefits and costs will still emerge, making a corporate 
diversification decision less or more attractive to firms. In this paper we examine the sensitivity 
of the diversification discount to corporate governance variables in light of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. We find that the diversification discount is explained to a large extent by poor corporate 
governance, especially by CEO power. Powerful CEOs have the ability to take independent 
investment decisions and are more inclined towards misallocating resources. However, such 
behavior has been limited by recent legislations, as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act limits the 
misconduct of CEOs and enhances corporate governance.  
Through dividing our sample to two subcategories: pre-SOX and post-SOX, we study the 
change in sensitivity of the corporate governance variable over the two time periods. Our 
results indicate that the negative effect of CEO power (the most relevant corporate governance 
variable in our analysis) on the efficient allocation of resources and on the excess value of the 
firm have decreased considerably after the passage of SOX. However, the decrease in the 
negative effect of CEO power is not due to reduction in that power but rather to the set of 
restrictions imposed by the act on CEOs behavior. Such decrease has significant economical 
implications; the limitation of the inefficient allocation of resources allows firms to save 
unwanted costs and to prevent value destruction associated with corporate diversification. 
However, future research will have to check whether such indirect benefits of the act are offset 
by its associated costs, especially its implementation cost.  
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Table 1 
Diversified firms distribution by number of 3-digit reported segments 
Summary statistics for a sample of 5,385 observations of multi-segment firms with total assets of more 
than $20 million and with no segments in the financial or the utility industry; the number of available 
observations for diversified firms presents the sample firms with fiscal year 1996-2005 data on 
Compustat industrial, segment and Execucomp. The sample is divided on the basis of the number of 
reported segments with different 3 digit codes.  
Number of Segments Number of Observations Number of Firms Percentage 
2 2341 456 43.47% 
3 1864 251 34.61% 
4 678 91 12.59% 
5 399 41 7.41% 
More than 5 103 10 1.91% 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Firm characteristics: Descriptive Statistics 
Summary statistics for the characteristics of the 849 multi-segment firms in our sample; Assets 
represents the book value of total assets in millions of dollars. Sales represents the value of annual sales 
expressed in millions of dollars. Capital is the market value of equity of a firm expressed by the product 
of shares outstanding by the closing price at the end of the fiscal year. Diversification Level is the inverse 
of the Herfindahl index of segments’ asset-weights; a higher index value corresponds to a higher level of 
diversification. Number of Segments is equal to the 3-digit segments operated by the multi-segment 
firm. If all the segments operated by the firm are within the same 3-digit code, the firm is considered a 
focused firm. Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The market 
value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of equity less the book value of 
equity.   
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. 5% 95% 
Assets (millions) 1608.39 5873.76 15723.52 219.27 23148.00 
Sales (millions) 2001.84 7347.49 21023.35 298.24 27479.40 
Capital (millions) 2980.25 13321.85 35080.53 408.99 61901.86 
Diversification Level 1.77 1.90 0.76 1.06 3.49 
Number of Segments 2 2.67 0.90 2 5 
Tobin’s Q 1.50 1.78 0.96 0.95 3.56 
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Table 3 
 Governance variables and definitions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description 
Board Size The number of directors on the board 
Number of Board Meetings The number of board meetings during the year 
Board Independence The proportion of outside directors on the board 
Audit Independence Dummy variable equals one if the Audit Committee is 
composed entirely of outside directors and zero otherwise 
Insider Ownership The proportion of common equity held by the firm’s directors 
and officers 
Directors Ownership The proportion of common equity held by directors 
CEO Ownership The proportion of common equity held by the CEO 
CEO Power Dummy variable equals one if the CEO is powerful and zero 
otherwise 
CEO Compensation Total Compensation in thousands of USD (Salary + Bonus + 
Other Annual + Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All 
Other + Value of Option Grants) 
CEO Chair Dummy variable equals one if the CEO is at same time 
serving as Chairman of the Board and zero otherwise 
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Table 4 
 Corporate Governance characteristics: Descriptive Statistics 
Summary statistics of ownership variables of the firms in our sample; Board Size represents the number 
of directors on the board. Number of Board Meetings refers to the number of board meetings during 
the fiscal year. Board Independence is measured by the proportion of outside directors on the board of 
directors. Audit Independence is a dummy variable equals one if the Audit Committee is composed 
entirely of outside directors and zero otherwise. Insider Ownership is equal to the proportion of 
common equity held by the firm’s directors and officers. Directors Ownership is equal to the proportion 
of common equity held by the firm’s directors. CEO Ownership is equal to the proportion of common 
equity held by the firm’s CEO. CEO Power is a measure of the CEO ability to take independent decisions 
within the firm; it is equal to a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the CEO is powerful and 
zero otherwise. CEO Compensation corresponds to the total Compensation in thousands of dollars 
(Salary + Bonus + Other Annual + Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of Option 
Grants) paid to the CEO during the fiscal year. Finally, CEO Chair is a dummy variable equals to one if the 
CEO is at the same time serving as the Chairman of the Board of Directors and zero otherwise.  
Governance Variables 
Median Mean Std. Dev. 5% 95% 
Board Size 8 8.11 2.87 0 13 
Number of Board Meetings 7 7.16 2.60 4 12 
Board Independence 0.67 0.65 0.20 3 0.9 
Audit Independence 1 0.78 0.43 0.29 1 
Insider Ownership 0.01 0.04 0.09 0 0.21 
Directors Ownership 0.01 0.07 0.16 0 0.31 
CEO Ownership 0.04 0.03 0.09 0 0.13 
CEO Power 1 0.62 0.48 0 1 
CEO Compensation(000) 2951.47 5448.06 8412.58 504.95 17873.05 
CEO Chair 1 0.67 0.47 0 1 
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Table 5 
Change in Corporate Governance Variables 
Evolution of the corporate governance variables over the period 1996-2005; the period is divided into 
two subcategories: Pre-SOX and Post-SOX. Pre-SOX refers to the period preceding the act (1996-2001). 
Post-SOX refers to the period subsequent to the act (2003-2005). Year 2002 is excluded from the sample 
because the passage and implementation of the act took place in that same year. Board Size represents 
the number of directors on the board. Number of Board Meetings refers to the number of board 
meetings during the fiscal year. Board Independence is measured by the proportion of outside directors 
on the board of directors. Audit Independence is a dummy variable equals one if the Audit Committee is 
composed entirely of outside directors and zero otherwise. Insider Ownership is equal to the proportion 
of common equity held by the firm’s directors and officers. Directors Ownership is equal to the 
proportion of common equity held by the firm’s directors. CEO Ownership is equal to the proportion of 
common equity held by the firm’s CEO. CEO Power is a measure of the CEO ability to take independent 
decisions within the firm; it is equal to a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the CEO is 
powerful and zero otherwise. CEO Compensation corresponds to the total Compensation in thousands 
of dollars (Salary + Bonus + Other Annual + Restricted Stock Grants + LTIP Payouts + All Other + Value of 
Option Grants) paid to the CEO during the fiscal year. CEO Chair is a dummy variable equals to one if the 
CEO is at the same time serving as the Chairman of the Board of Directors and zero otherwise.  
Governance Variables Pre-SOX Post-SOX Difference 
 Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean 
Board Size 7 6.451 9 9.151 2.000 2.700a 
Number of Board Meetings 7 7.269 7 7.401 0.000 0.132
Board Independence 
b 
0.620 0.583 0.714 0.697 0.094 0.114
Insider Ownership 
a 
0.006 0.041 0 0.018 -0.006 -0.023
Directors Ownership 
a 
0.013 0.063 0 0.030 -0.013 -0.033
CEO Ownership 
a 
0.003 0.028 0 0.012 -0.003 -0.016
Audit Independence 
a 
1 0.802 1 0.824 0.000 0.022
CEO Power 
a 
1 0.548 1 0.636 0.000 0.088
CEO Compensation(000) 
a 
2044 4534 2942 5123 898 589
CEO Chair 
a 
1 0.577 1 0.643 0.000 0.066a 
a: 5% significance level 
b:10% significance level 
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Table 6  
Correlation Matrix 
Pearson correlation matrix between the efficient allocation of resources, one firm characteristic variable 
(assets of the firm), one measure of diversification (number of segments) and 3 governance variables 
(directors’ ownership, CEO power and board independence); Assets represents the book value of total 
assets in millions of dollars. Number of Segments is equal to the 3-digit segments operated by the multi-
segment firm.  Directors Ownership is equal to the proportion of common equity held by the firm’s 
directors. CEO Power is a measure of the CEO ability to take independent decisions within the firm; it is 
equal to a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the CEO is powerful and zero otherwise. Board 
Independence is measured by the proportion of outside directors on the board of directors. 
 
Assets Tobin's Q 
Number of 
Segments 
Directors 
Ownership CEO Power 
Board 
Independence 
Assets 1      
Tobin's Q 0.06 1     
Number of Segments 0.11 -0.01 1    
Directors Ownership -0.04 0.02 -0.03 1   
CEO Power -0.12 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 1  
Board Independence 0.08 0.04 0.08 -0.25 0.16 1 
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Table 7 
Effect of CEO power on the Efficient Allocation of Resources 
Three regression tables covering the entire sample, the Pre-SOX and the Post-SOX period; the entire 
sample period covers the years 1996-2005. The Pre-SOX period refers to the period preceding the act 
(1996-2001). The Post-SOX period refers to the period subsequent to the act (2003-2005). Year 2002 is 
excluded from the sample because the passage and implementation of the act took place in that same 
year.  The dependant variable in these regressions is the efficient allocation of resources; independent 
variables include Log of Assets, CEO Power, Audit Independence, and Number of Segments. Log of 
Assets is the natural log of the book value of total assets. CEO Power is a measure of the CEO ability to 
take independent decisions within the firm; it is equal to a dummy variable which takes a value of one if 
the CEO is powerful and zero otherwise. Audit Independence is a dummy variable equals one if the Audit 
Committee is composed entirely of outside directors and zero otherwise. Number of Segments is equal 
to the 3-digit segments operated by the multi-segment firm. 
N 
Total Sample Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
Log (Assets) 0.065 0.094 0.011 
  4.94 4.76 0.58 
CEO Power -0.117 -0.123 -0.068 
  -3.07 -2.21 -1.21 
Audit Independence -0.057 -0.121 0.84 
  -1.28 9.78 1.19 
Number of Segments -0.047 -0.053 -0.049 
 -2.22 -1.65 -1.69 
N 2769 1611 851 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 
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Table 8 
 Effect of CEO power on the Excess Value 
Three regression tables covering the entire sample, the Pre-SOX and the Post-SOX period; the entire 
sample period covers the years 1996-2005. The Pre-SOX period refers to the period preceding the act 
(1996-2001). The Post-SOX period refers to the period subsequent to the act (2003-2005). Year 2002 is 
excluded from the sample because the passage and implementation of the act took place in that same 
year.  The dependant variable in these regressions is the excess value; independent variables include Log 
of Assets, CEO Power, Tobin’s Q, and Board Independence. Log of Assets is the natural log of the book 
value of total assets. CEO Power is a measure of the CEO ability to take independent decisions within the 
firm; it is equal to a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the CEO is powerful and zero 
otherwise. Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The market value 
of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of equity less the book value of equity.   
Board Independence is measured by the proportion of outside directors on the board of directors.  
N Total Sample Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
Log (Assets) -0.003 -0.017 0.014 
  -0.38 -1.33 1.27 
CEO Power -0.112 -0.166 -0.014 
  -4.43 -4.61 -0.38 
Tobin's Q 0.174 0.157 0.237 
  13.95 9.78 11.38 
Board Independence 0.246 0.15 0.013 
 4.06 1.9 0.11 
N 2769 1611 851 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.13 
 
